The longest period spent in space so far is 438 days by Valeri Polyakov, a Russian cosmonaut, in the Russian space station Mir; a typical length of stay in the ISS is around 6 months (180 days). The flight to Mars typically takes between 150-300 days. The stay on Mars will be indefinite.
The flight poses some risk, for example from cosmic radiation, but that aside it is reasonable to assume that the Mars crews can cope psychologically with the flight, provided that suitable methods have been used to select astronauts with the right mental attributes.
It is well known that many astronauts, and those stationed in isolated places such as the Antarctic, often view their experiences as being very positive despite the attendant risks and psychological stress, although that does not mean that no psychological problems arise in these situations. Similarly, it is not uncommon that people come to view stressful or difficult experiences in a positive way, but that is in retrospect, when the situation has terminated.
Space flight experience shows that crew behaviour can change with time, for example by developing a reluctance to communicate to outsiders, with less trust of external people (psychological closing), and a tendency towards “groupthink”, which can seriously degrade the decision making capacity of the group to the point where irrational decisions are made.
There is of course one fundamental difference between any previous spaceflight and that proposed by the Mars One project, that there is no return for the astronauts. For every previous astronaut there was at least the expectation of a return. The Mars One project will be pushing their crews into uncharted territory in psychological terms.
The real test for any Mars would-be colonist will probably come once they are on Mars, although since the mission is (presumably) one of no return once the transit vehicle leaves earth orbit, the realization of their situation could hit very hard almost immediately.
Whilst in training the crews may well be able to put aside any thoughts or anxiety they may have about the nature of their commitment; after all, until they actually launch they can withdraw. Peer pressure, the excitement of being in the training process, fear of failure coupled with a feeling of importance engendered by the attention of a worldwide television audience may all allay any doubts they may have. There may also be an implicit assumption that the project may not succeed in getting to a manned launch, or that they would be unlikely to be selected for the first flight. It would not be surprising if some of the astronauts fall out of the training process shortly after entering it, and that a number withdraw immediately prior to launch.
The candidate astronauts would and do argue that it is their decision to accept the attendant risk, but is it not as simple as that.
In agreeing to travel to Mars the astronauts clearly have to be shown to be of sound mind and of sufficient mental capacity to understand the risk they are undertaking. The implication is that they have to have an informed knowledge of the risk and that the Mars One project has a duty to evaluate and inform the astronauts of that risk. It is insufficient for the project just to maintain that the astronauts must accept an unspecified level of risk, a level that will depend on decisions that the project will make around such elements as the degree of equipment testing required, spare parts inventories, system duplication, and the provision and capacity of back-up or emergency systems. Some form of risk analysis will surely have to be carried out.
In the West even governments can be held liable if they are negligent in their duty of care. If the Mars One project was negligent, for example, by providing equipment that they knew or should have known to be inadequate, or not properly tested, or they had failed to consider likely risks that the astronauts face and failed to prepare adequately for them, then might that leave the organization open to being sued? Surely there can be no absolute waiver of responsibility by the astronauts.
The philosophy of a one way trip can be seen as a critical weakness in the Mars One scheme; can any training really prepare the crew for the finality of their commitment? Even if the astronauts should survive the trip and the landing, and manage to establish stable operation of the habitat, there may be a dreadful inevitability that it is the psychological stress arising from the finality of a one way trip, rather than any fundamental technical barrier, that will condemn the crew to die on Mars. It may be that any astronaut who does not have an overwhelming and compelling reason for a lifetime’s commitment will not survive living in what may come to resemble a cramped prison. The availability of a return trip would surely make the psychological problems much easier to manage.
According to Lansdorp the selected candidates will be put into 4 person crews and train as a crew. The crews will be left to develop their own basis for decision making, the argument being that once on Mars the project would not be able to control how they organized themselves. In the ISS (and presumably all previous space flights) there is a predefined command structure, with the ISS Commander ultimately responsible, and solely accountable, to the flight director (on Earth). The ISS crew members also have clearly defined responsibilities.
The Mars One project will have to be very careful about what decisions might be made within these crews about how to organize themselves if these arrangements are to survive into the mission.
The crews will also have to consider a range of ethical and moral questions. If one of the crew should become incapacitated (for example through a major accident or insanity) the lives of the remaining crew could be jeopardized. Would the others be prepared to kill that crew member? What process would they use to arrive at that decision?
What if the life support systems proved incapable of supporting all 4 crew members, but could support 1 or 2 or 3 of the crew. Would they sacrifice one or more of their number to save the others? If so, how would the group chose who should die. Should the crew have a humane method of killing or committing suicide?
The stated aim of the project is colonization of Mars. Each crew will consist of two men and two women. Rightly, the Mars One project says that it will advise the colonists not to have children. The effect of reduced gravity on the development of a human fetus and the subsequent development through childhood is unknown. The medical risks to the mother and child are likely to be high as medical facilities would be extremely limited. The habitat is likely to be unsuitable and dangerous for a child and the psychological problems that might arise can only be guessed at.
Many might consider that it would be irresponsible for the first astronauts to have children. It could be argued that exposing a child to that existence would be immoral, the child would have exercised no choice, living in an unnatural, zoo like environment, particularly given the ‘reality TV’ nature of the project. There are also risks of genetic damage from radiation. What if a child was born significantly disabled, physically or mentally, would the early colonists have to consider euthanasia?
Many of those connected to the Mars One project make reference to the pioneering spirit of earlier explorers and colonists on Earth, to cast the aims of the project into some grand quest for the enrichment of humanity. But most movement of people was driven by the pressures of war, poverty or oppression, or by the desire for conquest or riches. Desperate people will accept huge risks. Exploration came from a gradual process of extending the boundaries of the known and most explorers presumably at least had the intention of returning home.
[Credit - NASA]
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